University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Law Faculty Scholarship

University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce
School of Law

1-1-2003

Brief of Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent
Thomas G. Field Jr
Franklin Pierce Law Center

William O. Hennessey
Franklin Pierce Law Center

Craig S. Jepson
Franklin Pierce Law Center

Karl F. Jorda
Franklin Pierce Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the
Technology and Innovation Commons

Recommended Citation
Field, Thomas G. Jr; Hennessey, William O.; Jepson, Craig S.; and Jorda, Karl F., "Brief of Law Professors
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent" (2003). Law Faculty Scholarship. 393.
https://scholars.unh.edu/law_facpub/393

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more
information, please contact sue.zago@law.unh.edu.

No. 05-130
================================================================

In The

Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------EBAY, INC. AND HALF.COM., INC.,
Petitioners,
v.
MERCEXCHANGE, L.L.C.,
Respondent.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Federal Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF LAW PROFESSORS
AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------THOMAS G. FIELD, JR.
Professor of Law
FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
2 White Street
Concord, N.H. 03301
(603) 228-1541
Counsel of Record
================================================================
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

WILLIAM O. HENNESSEY
Professor of Law
FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
2 White Street
Concord, N.H. 03301
(603) 228-1541
CRAIG S. JEPSON
Professor of Law
FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
2 White Street
Concord, N.H. 03301
(603) 228-1541
KARL F. JORDA
Professor of Law
FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
2 White Street
Concord, N.H. 03301
(603) 228-1541

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................

iii

INTEREST OF AMICI ...................................................

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................

1

ARGUMENT...................................................................

2

I.

II.

Patent Rights Are Conditional And Limited.....

2

A. Patents Represent A Bargain With The
United States Government .........................

2

B. Patents Are Subject To Many Legislative
And Judicial Limitations ............................

3

Precedent, Coupled With Evidence Of Legislative And Executive Choices, Counsels
Against Ordinarily Obligating Patent Owners
To License Other Than Through Arms-Length
Bargaining ..........................................................

5

A. Paper Bag Held That Patent Holders’
Obligations To Use Protected Inventions Is
Principally For Congress To Determine .....

5

B. Coe Confirmed That The Consequences Of
Nonuse Are Principally For Congress To
Determine ....................................................

7

C. Dawson Confirmed That Circumstances
Warranting Compulsory Licenses Are
Principally For Congress To Determine .....

8

D. Reluctant To Deter Innovation, The
Executive Branch Is Unwilling To Circumvent Patents Despite Short-Term
Need And Unambiguous Authority ............

9

ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
III.

The Decision Below Properly Rejected The
District Court’s Reasons For Denying Equitable Relief To MercExchange............................

11

A. The District Court Did Not Apply Proper
Precedent .....................................................

11

B. The Decision Below Applied The Correct
Standard Of Review For Injunctions
Despite Failure To Recite It Explicitly .......

13

CONCLUSION ...............................................................

14

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219
(1970) ................................................................................ 4
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141 (1989) ................................................................. 2
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).............................. 4
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971) ............................................................... 13
City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d
577 (7th Cir. 1934)............................................................ 4
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999) .................................... 4
Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908)................................5, 6, 7, 11, 12
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S.
176 (1980) ..................................................................... 8, 9
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002) .......................................... 3
Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317
(2d Cir. 1974) .............................................................11, 12
Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853
F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988) .............................................. 10
Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) .............................................. 13
High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image
Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1995) .............. 13, 14
Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)......................................................................... 13

iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d
1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ...................................................... 13
Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States, 353 F.Supp.2d
1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) ............................................. 13
Kelo v. City of New London, Connecticut, 125 S.Ct.
2655 (2005) ..................................................................... 10
McPherson’s Ltd. v. Never Dull, Inc., 960 F.2d 156
(Table), 1992 WL 52140 (Fed. Cir. 1992)......................... 3
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d
695 (E.D. Va. 2003)..............................................11, 12, 14
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) ................................................................................ 4
Pfaff v. Wells Elec., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998)........................ 2
Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945) ............... 7, 8
United States v. Am. Bell Teleph. Co., 167 U.S. 249
(1897) ................................................................................ 5
United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52
(1973) ................................................................................ 4
Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research
Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) ............................... 4
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1880) .............................. 3
STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const., 11th Amendment ............................................. 4
28 U.S.C. § 1338 ................................................................... 3
28 U.S.C. § 1498 ................................................................... 4
35 U.S.C. § 101 ..................................................................... 2

v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
35 U.S.C. § 102 ..................................................................... 2
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)................................................................. 3
35 U.S.C. § 103 ..................................................................... 2
35 U.S.C. § 112 ..................................................................... 2
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ............................................................ 3
35 U.S.C. § 203 ..................................................................... 3
35 U.S.C. § 209 ..................................................................... 3
35 U.S.C. § 271 ............................................................... 3, 14
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) ................................................................. 8
35 U.S.C. § 283 ....................................................................11
42 U.S.C. § 7608 ................................................................... 3
OTHER MATERIALS
Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation:
The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy (2003) .................................................... 10
House Democrats Press for Compulsory Licensing
Authority, FDA Week, Nov. 11, 2005, 2005 WLNR
18263219......................................................................... 10
Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies, 445
(3d Ed. 2002)................................................................... 14
Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the
Evolution of U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards
Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth to
Early Twenty-First Century, 7 Tul. J. Tech. &
Intell. Prop. 227, 239-41 (2005) ....................................... 9

1
INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici’s sole interest in this case is the proper development and application of patent law to promote innova1
tion and competition. Amici teach and write about patent
law; all also have patent law experience. This brief is
submitted to provide the Court with scholarly assistance
informed by experience.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Inventors lacking assurance of a market, or even the
right to practice patented inventions, face considerable
risk. Those who qualify for patents, in return for disclosure, receive only the assistance of the courts in excluding
others from economic exploitation of their inventions.
Already subject to many legislative and judicial limitations, patents should not be further subject to the functional equivalent of private inverse condemnation without
congressional action.
Precedents of this Court hold that patentees forfeit no
rights for nonuse as such and that private parties are not
ordinarily free to practice protected inventions upon
payment of a judicially-determined royalty. Indeed, in rare
instances where Congress authorizes public taking, the
executive branch hesitates for fear of deterring socially
and economically important innovation.
1
Pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 37.6, the amici represent that they have
authored this brief in whole; no person or entity other than Franklin
Pierce Law Center has made any monetary contribution to its preparation or submission. On December 10, 2005, counsel for the respective
parties consented by email to the filing of this brief.
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The trial court accepted arguments analogous, given
the apparent economic disparity between the parties, to
ones Goliath might have made in asking that David be
disarmed. It failed to cite the most relevant precedent
when refusing an injunction to a party actively seeking to
exploit its patents. Nor did the trial court identify a public
interest that might, despite precedent, warrant such
refusal.
An appellate court does not overreach in reversing
decisions unsupported by facts, law or sound reasons.
Failure to recite that proposition does not warrant reversal of the decision below.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------ARGUMENT
I.

Patent Rights Are Conditional And Limited.
A. Patents Represent A Bargain With The
United States Government.

To obtain patents, applicants must satisfy the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that inventions for
which protection is sought are useful, novel and nonobvious. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102 (2001) and 103 (Supp. 2005).
Applicants must also disclose the best mode of practicing
their inventions so that others may practice them upon
expiration of their patents. 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (2001).
Utility, novelty and nonobviousness are conditions for
patent grants, but disclosure is the applicants’ quid pro
quo for a “carefully crafted bargain.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989);
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998). In
return, owners are normally entitled to the aid of federal
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courts in excluding others from, e.g., making, using or
selling subject matter described in allowed claims. 35
U.S.C.A. §§ 154(a)(1), 271 (2001); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338
(Supp. 2005).
B. Patents Are Subject To Many Legislative
And Judicial Limitations.
First, patent owners are permitted to do nothing,
Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880), except
exclude others from practicing inventions encompassed
literally, or, rarely, by equivalence, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 726
(2002), within the scope of claims negotiated with the
PTO.
Second, patentees are strictly liable for information
available when claimed inventions were made. Rights are
subject to loss regardless of whether applicants were, or
reasonably could have been, expected to know of applicable prior art. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (includes foreign publications). A priori, applicants unaware of the market for
inventions have less incentive to scour the literature for
potentially fatal art than infringers subsequently aware of
the stakes.
Third, applicants’ lack of candor during PTO examination may render otherwise valid rights unenforceable.
McPherson’s Ltd. v. Never Dull, Inc., 960 F.2d 156 (Table),
1992 WL 52140 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
Fourth, patents, when granted, may be subject to
statutory compulsory licenses. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7608
(2003) (Clean Air Act) and 35 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 2005)
(federally-funded inventions); see also, 35 U.S.C.A. § 209
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(2001 & Supp. 2005) (termination of exclusive license on
federally-owned inventions).
Fifth, patent misuse may result in forfeiture of all
rights. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) (conditioning patent use on purchase of unpatented
supplies); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964) (conditioning use on agreement to pay royalties beyond patent
term). In apparently less egregious circumstances, patentees may be obligated only to license others. United States
v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973) (compulsory
licensing is a “well established form[ ] of relief when
necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where
patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed
to the antitrust violation adjudicated.”).
Sixth, patents are subject to public inverse condemnation. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1498 (Supp. 2005) (limits relief against
the federal government to suits for damages in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims); see also College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Educational Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627
(1999) (federal suits against states based on the Patent Act
are barred by the 11th Amendment).
Last, patentees have also, if rarely, been subject to
2
private inverse condemnation. City of Milwaukee v.
Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir. 1934)
(court refused to shut down an infringing city-owned waste
treatment plant); Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
2

Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146
F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945) is oft cited for the same proposition, but, at 146
F.2d 946-47, the opinion states: “Since our consideration of the record
convinces us that the patents are invalid, we have concluded that
equity will best be served by disposing of the case on that ground.”
Moreover, patentee was faulted for egregious misconduct, 146 F.2d 946.
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N.Y.2d 219, 225 n.*, 228 (App. Div. 1970) (a $45 million
cement plant employing 300 people was found to be a
nuisance, but the court awarded permanent damages,
thereby imposing a servitude on plaintiffs’ land).
II.

Precedent, Coupled With Evidence Of Legislative And Executive Choices, Counsels Against
Ordinarily Obligating Patent Owners To License Other Than Through Arms-Length Bargaining.
A. Paper Bag Held That Patent Holders’ Obligations To Use Protected Inventions Is
Principally For Congress To Determine.

Defendant, in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), argued that plaintiff ’s
unexplained nonuse of patented technology warranted
denial of an injunction. Before addressing that question
however, the Court chose first to consider the rights
conferred, 210 U.S. at 423. On that point, the opinion
quotes United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167
U.S. 249, 250 (1897), where the Court had rejected a
similar argument:
Counsel seem to argue that one who has made an
invention and thereupon applies for a patent
therefor occupies, as it were, the position of a
quasi trustee for the public; that he is under a
sort of moral obligation to see that the public acquires the right to the free use of that invention
as soon as is conveniently possible. We dissent
entirely from the thought thus urged. The inventor is one who has discovered something of value.
It is his absolute property. He may withhold the
knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which
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the statute promises to him who discloses to the
public his invention.
Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424.
Although the circuit court had apparently inferred an
improper motive from the patentee’s nonuse, the Court
wrote:
[I]t is certainly disputable that the nonuse was
unreasonable. . . . There was no question of a diminished supply of or increase of prices, and can
it be said, as a matter of law, that a nonuse was
unreasonable which had for its motive the saving
of the expense that would have been involved by
changing the equipment of a factory from one set
of machines to another? And even if the old machines could have been altered, the expense
would have been considerable.
Id. at 429. The Court thus held:
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, we answer
that such exclusion may be said to have been of
the very essence of the right conferred by the
patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of
property to use or not use it, without question of
motive.
Id.
That decision was largely predicated on deference to
evidence of congressional choices. The Court pointed out
that Congress had not overlooked patentees’ nonuse. It
had been aware of hostility toward nonuse abroad and,
indeed, had briefly imposed forfeiture for aliens’ nonuse.
But Congress no longer required use by alien, much less
domestic, patentees. Although the opinion ends with
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recognition that “a court of equity might be justified in
withholding relief by injunction,” 210 U.S. at 429, it does
not elaborate.
B. Coe Confirmed That The Consequences Of
Nonuse Are Principally For Congress To
Determine.
In Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945),
the court of appeals had upheld a refusal to grant a patent
“upon the ground that petitioner did not intend to make or
use the invention. . . . ” Id. at 371. The Court reversed,
however, stating: “[T]he court below assumed that such
purpose . . . would invalidate the patent because it would
be contrary to the constitutional purpose and to the spirit
if not the letter of the patent laws. We think both assumptions are unwarranted.” Id. at 377.
The Court went on to say: “This Court has consistently held that failure of the patentee to make use of a
patented invention does not affect the validity of the
patent.” Id. at 378-79. Once again, it observed: “Congress
has frequently been asked to change the policy of the
statutes as interpreted by this Court by imposing a forfeiture or providing for compulsory licensing if the patent is
not used within a specified time, but has not done so.” Id.
at 379 (notes omitted). Yet, the opinion further states: “The
record establishes no intention by petitioner not to use his
invention, and no proposed use of it disclosed or suggested
by the record affords any basis for withholding the grant of
the patent.” Id. at 380.
Justice Douglas, joined by two others, urged that the
patent legislation interpreted in light of the Constitution
supported an obligation to use. Id. at 380 (Douglas, J.,
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dissenting). His opinion cites a 1941 report for the proposition that nonuse and related “maneuvers retard, rather
than promote, the progress of the useful arts.” Id. at 382.
He went on to consider “an invention or discovery which
unlocks the doors of science and reveals the secrets of a
dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be
permitted to suppress that invention for seventeen years
(the term of the letters patent) and withhold from humanity the benefits of the cure?” Id. at 383. As addressed
above, however, that hypothetical outcome is not only
3
4
unlikely, but also has no bearing on the present case.
C. Dawson Confirmed That Circumstances
Warranting Compulsory Licenses Are Principally For Congress To Determine.
Whereas Coe considered nonuse but not compulsory
licensing, Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co.,
448 U.S. 176 (1980), considered the converse situation.
Rohm and Haas was indeed using its patent – one that
claimed the sole known use of an unclaimed product.
Because the doctrine of contributory infringement reflected in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) precluded Dawson from using
an unpatented product, it argued that a license should be
compelled. The Court disagreed. Once again reflecting
deference to Congress, the opinion states: “Compulsory
3
4

See supra note 2.

Justice Rutledge, however, maintained that the record did not
support a need to address “the interesting and important questions
debated by the Court’s opinion and my dissenting brethren.” Coe, 324
U.S. at 384 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The rejected claims might well
have encompassed terrain captured within the doctrine of equivalents,
but he would have affirmed the administrative conclusion that the
proffered claims were not literally supported by the specification.

9
licensing is a rarity in our patent system, and we decline
to manufacture such a requirement,” id. at 215.
Most significantly in the context of the present dispute, note 21, appended to the just-quoted language,
states: “Compulsory licensing of patents often has been
proposed, but it has never been enacted on a broad scale.
Although compulsory licensing provisions were considered
for possible incorporation into the 1952 revision of the
patent laws, they were dropped before the final bill was
circulated.” Id., n.21.
D. Reluctant To Deter Innovation, The Executive Branch Is Unwilling To Circumvent
Patents Despite Short-Term Need And Unambiguous Authority.
Nonuse is akin to suboptimal use of patents. In 2001,
following the anthrax scare, the Bush Administration
threatened to compromise exclusivity for the drug Cipro
when it appeared more would be needed than Bayer could
5
produce. Threats apparently were adequate to address
public health concerns, but they generated unintended
consequences insofar as other countries had been previ6
ously lobbied to reduce or eliminate compulsory licensing.
Perhaps as a result, the Bush Administration is now

5

See, e.g., Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the
Evolution of U.S. Patent Law and Policy Towards Foreign Patent Laws
in the Late Twentieth to Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 227, 239-41 (2005).
6

Id. at 232.

10
apparently reluctant, despite considerable pressure, to
7
compel Roche to license Tamiflu.
The reason, of course, is that the Administration is
subject to even more counter pressure. One might think
that firms holding exclusive rights, if assured of a reasonable return on investment, would be little affected by
having others help meet public needs, but that is not true.
The reasons are complex and go well beyond the objections
expressed by the petitioners (and the dissenters) in Kelo v.
City of New London, Connecticut, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
For example, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and
Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988), Judge
Markey wrote: “Determining a fair and reasonable royalty
is often . . . a difficult judicial chore, seeming often to
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a
judge.” Risk of error is unavoidable for prior infringement,
but injunctions eliminate it for future infringement.
Thus, the Federal Trade Commission, in To Promote
Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy (2003), recently noted, e.g., Ch. 2 at 32 and
Ch. 3 at 38, concern about non-practicing entities. The
FTC did not recommend a solution and certainly did not
recommend that all non-practicing patentees be limited to
only legal remedies, much less regardless of pursuit of
arms-length licenses. Had it done so, however, surely its
recommendation would have been addressed to Congress,
not the courts.

7

See, e.g., House Democrats Press for Compulsory Licensing
Authority, FDA WEEK, Nov. 11, 2005, 2005 WLNR 18263219.
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III. The Decision Below Properly Rejected The
District Court’s Reasons For Denying Equitable Relief To MercExchange.
A. The District Court Did Not Apply Proper
Precedent.
In MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d
695 (E.D. Va. 2003), a jury returned a verdict finding
defendants liable for $35 million for willfully infringing
MercExchange’s patents. Id. at 698. After referring to the
court’s authority to issue injunctions under 35 U.S.C.
§ 283, the court states: “[T]he grant of injunctive relief
against the infringer is considered the norm; however, the
decision to grant or deny injunctive relief remains within
the discretion of the trial judge.” Id. at 711. It also notes
the four factors that have traditionally informed courts’
discretion before explaining their applicability in this case.
Id.
Yet, in ultimately refusing injunctive relief, that court
failed to cite, much less distinguish, Paper Bag. Its failure
is remarkable because, in explaining why plaintiff is not
irreparably harmed, the opinion stresses that “plaintiff
does not practice its inventions and exists merely to
license its patented technology to others.” Id. at 712.
Rather, the trial court relied heavily on Foster v.
American Machine & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir.
1974) in limiting MercExchange to its legal remedy. eBay,
275 F.Supp.2d at 713. Foster, too, failed to cite Paper Bag
in concluding: “To grant [the patentee] a compulsory
royalty is to give him half a loaf. In the circumstance of his
utter failure to exploit the patent on his own, that seems
fair.” Foster, 492 F.2d at 1324. That is difficult to fathom
when that language squarely addresses the central issue
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in Paper Bag. In any event, it is starkly at odds with the
holding of the most relevant precedent.
The district court also relied principally on Foster with
regard to the balance of hardships when it wrote: “Any
harm suffered by the plaintiff, by the defendants’ infringement of the patents, can be recovered by way of
damages.” eBay, 275 F.Supp.2d at 714. Thus, three of the
factors relevant to equitable relief seem ultimately to have
collapsed into one.
With regard to public interest, the fourth factor, the
district court did not suggest that MercExchange had
misused its patents or that its right to injunctive relief
8
was otherwise compromised by anything discussed above.
Nor does its opinion suggest that MercExchange should be
subject to the functional equivalent of private inverse
condemnation to reduce or avoid serious public health
risks.
On the contrary, the court concluded: “[T]he public
interest factor equally supports granting an injunction to
protect the plaintiff ’s patent rights, and denying an
injunction to protect the public’s interest in using a patented business-method that the patent holder declines to
practice.” Id. at 714. Its explanation credits the importance of injunctions in encouraging activities supported by
patent grants but again relies on patentee’s nonuse.
Moreover, with no credible support, that explanation
suggests that owners of so-far unlicensed business-method
patents would never be entitled to injunctions. Id. at 713.

8

Supra Part I.B.

13
That qualifies more as a legislative judgment than as an
ad hoc exercise of equitable discretion.
B. The Decision Below Applied The Correct
Standard Of Review For Injunctions Despite Failure To Recite It Explicitly.
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 416 (1971), the Court held that the standard of
review for abuse of discretion is narrow, but that decisions,
to be upheld, must be based on a consideration of relevant
factors and not evidence a clear error of judgment. Many
decisions show that the Federal Circuit applies this
standard correctly.
Thus, Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d
1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1988), upheld denial, on public
interest grounds, of a preliminary patent injunction
against potentially infringing hepatitis and cancer test
kits. Likewise, High Tech Medical Instrumentation, Inc. v.
New Image Industries, Inc., 49 F.3d 1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1995), upheld denial of a preliminary patent injunction
based on, for example, delay and weak evidence of likely
success on the merits, particularly absent evidence of
harm pendente lite. Most recently, the court, in Fuji Photo
Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2005), upheld denial of a permanent patent
injunction subsumed by relief already provided in a
related proceeding before the International Trade Com9
mission.

9
Jazz Photo Corp. v. U.S., 353 F.Supp.2d 1327 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2004); see also Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094,
(Continued on following page)

14
In the case on review, however, as discussed above,
the trial court ignored the most relevant precedent and,
sua sponte, applied a rule prejudicial to a whole class of
patent owners. eBay, 275 F.Supp.2d at 713. It also applied
High Tech Med. Instrumentation without considering
critical differences between withholding preliminary and
10
permanent relief, or factoring in that the jury found that
eBay had not only infringed but had done so willfully. Id.
at 712. In such circumstances, reversal, even under the
abuse of discretion standard, should not require protracted
formal discussion.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------CONCLUSION
Absent congressional action, owners should be further
obligated neither to use nor to permit other private parties
to engage in activities forbidden by 35 U.S.C. § 271. For
that and other foregoing reasons, the judgment below
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS G. FIELD, JR.
Professor of Law
FRANKLIN PIERCE LAW CENTER
2 White Street
Concord, N.H. 03301
(603) 228-1541
Counsel of Record
1110-11 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (disapproving ITC’s exclusion of refurbished
cameras originally purchased in the United States).
10

See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES, 445
(3d Ed. 2002) (“Courts at the preliminary relief stage routinely find no
irreparable injury in injuries they would find irreparable after a full trial.”).

